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SOCIAL EVOLUTION FORUM
Three Wishes for the World
Harvey Whitehouse
University of Oxford
If you had three wishes to change the world, what would they be?
Perhaps you would like to put an end to war? Reverse global
warming? Or eliminate extreme poverty?

Introduction
The key to solving all these problems is glue. It doesn’t come in a tube. It’s a
very special adhesive – the kind that holds societies together. Social scientists
call it ‘social cohesion’ or ‘solidarity’. Whatever we choose to call it, social glue
is what makes people cooperate and solve problems for the greater good.
Understanding how groups become glued together is crucial to addressing
some of the biggest issues facing humanity today.
If I had three wishes for the world, they would be:
1. To predict, prevent, and resolve civil wars. We know that about half of all
insurgencies peter out within a year of their formation. Those that survive
seem to have found the knack for producing the social glue we are interested
in. Attacking such groups with bullets and bombs actually seems to bind them
even more tightly together. If you want to disband groups like this it would be
more effective to sabotage the mechanisms that fuse them to a common cause.
The more we understand these mechanisms the more we can do to curtail
sectarian violence, genocide, and many other forms of civil conflict.
2. To channel social cohesion for the collective good. Civil strife can
produce social glue. We had a researcher on the ground in Libya throughout
the recent revolution observing how the collective will of ordinary
citizens brought a modern army to its knees (albeit with some help from
NATO). We now know more about the mechanisms that made this possible. If
only that energy could have been harnessed more productively in the
aftermath of Gaddafi’s downfall, then Libya might be a very different place
today.
3. To mobilize a global response to economic inequality and environmental
threat. Many social movements in the twentieth century experimented with
rituals aimed at binding us together as a species to solve world problems.
Corresponding author’s e-mail: harvey.whitehouse@anthro.ox.ac.uk
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Those experiments have largely failed – visions of a communist utopia or a
brotherhood of man have been shattered by old divisions or faded in time. But
that doesn’t mean they couldn’t work. We are currently studying movements of
this kind on the Pacific island archipelago of Vanuatu. Imagine if we could find
a new and more effective way of gluing together our species as a whole,
championing a set of shared values and goals underwritten by a universal
morality rather than a doctrinal orthodoxy of any kind. That would be the first
crucial step in solving some of the world’s biggest collective action problems –
global warming and extreme poverty being only two examples.
Pie in the sky? Some of us don’t think so. I direct a project that tries to
explain how social glue is produced and how it can be used (Whitehouse 2012;
Jones 2013). It is the single largest project ever funded by the UK’s Economic
and Social Research Council and it is also the most international one ever,
involving the coordinated efforts of scientists not only in North America and
Europe, but also around the world, including many countries that are not often
associated with scientific breakthroughs. It has to be that way, because the glue
we are interested in is often stronger in traditional or rural cultures and
weaker in the big urban centres where scientists typically work.

Two Kinds of Social Glue
There are two main kinds of social glue: ‘social identification’ and ‘identity
fusion’. The latter is most simply described as a visceral sense of oneness with
others in one’s group. This may be manifested in a variety of ways. For
instance, when another group member is threatened it prompts the same
defensive reactions as a personal attack. For the fused individual, the boundary
between the personal and social self is porous – activation of one’s sense of
personal self also serves to activate feelings about the social self. Fused
individuals regard other members of their group as irreplaceable, and seek to
reform and reintegrate them when they violate their group’s norms rather than
kicking them out for good. When the group is under attack, or their status
threatened, fusion increases commitment to maintain the group.
Identity fusion is a widespread feature of kin groups and other small social
units whose members share the trials and tribulations of life together. This
sharing of experiences as well as the memories of those experiences,
particularly of enduring and overcoming hardships, seems to be an important
part of the mechanism generating fusion, most commonly within families but
sometimes also within much larger groups.
My mother remembers how tightly glued together our family was
throughout the war. During the Blitz they spent a lot of time huddled together
in bomb shelters. One night, however, my mother’s uncle and aunt and their
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young son emerged before the All Clear had been sounded, and went inside.
The last bomb of the air raid fell on their house and they were killed instantly.
An evacuee at the time, my mother only heard about the tragedy months
later. She was on the top deck of a bus. She remembers it being a glorious day,
the pretty summer dress she was wearing, that it was a treat to get the seat at
the front. Her mother turned to her and said: “Your uncle and auntie’s house
was bombed and they were inside it. Your cousin too.” That was all. It would
have been improper to display emotion in public, so where better to deliver the
news than on a crowded London bus? My mother was nine years old at the
time.
It is very unlikely my mother would have remembered the weather or what
she was wearing or even where she was sitting that day on the bus, were it not
for the emotional impact of my grandmother’s words. Integral to our sense of
self is a set of memories of past experiences, including episodes that are felt to
be especially salient in forming who we are. Such episodes will often relate to
painful or disturbing experiences because these are generally better
remembered than pleasant or gratifying ones.
While these ‘bad’ experiences come to form part of our personal
autobiographies that does not necessarily mean they are rehearsed as
narratives. Often, there are social disincentives to talk about such experiences
— because they conflict with idealized conceptions of family life, gender roles,
Britishness, or whatever. But that doesn’t mean the memories are lost. They
remain as part of our private sense of self. Indeed this sense of privacy, of
experience that is internally generated rather than externally imposed, adds to
the authenticity of these aspects of our self-conception.
The impression that highly salient personal experiences are shared by
others fuels the fusion of self and other. It is as if those who have been through
the same thing are more ‘like us’ and the boundary between self and other
becomes more porous. This would help to explain why people who endure
terrible ordeals, such as natural disasters or wars, or who have experienced
persecution or oppression, often feel a special bond with their fellow sufferers.
My mother, for example, felt a special connection with children who turned up
at school with black armbands. And conversely, it can feel as if people who
haven’t actually experienced your pain themselves cannot truly understand it,
and may seem inauthentic if they talk about the subject with an air of
authority.
In all these respects, identity fusion differs from what psychologists call
‘social identification’ (Swann et al. 2012). Social identity theorists have
repeatedly shown that personal and group identities are non-overlapping.
Social identity and group identity have a sort of hydraulic relationship to each
other: the more one is activated, the less the other is. If your group identity
prevails in your social life, the less prominently social identity will feature.
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Attacks on the group activate social but not personal selves in people who
identify with, but are not fused with, the group. Pro-group action is not
motivated by the personal self. Members of the group are replaceable and
norm violators can be more readily excluded from the group. When the status
of the group is threatened, identification with the group is weakened.

Shared Dysphoria, Fusion, and Extreme Rituals
In 2011, project researcher Brian McQuinn went to Misrata, Libya, to study
people’s experiences of the siege of their city by Gaddafi’s troops. Amid the
victory celebrations, I joined him there. In collaboration with Bill Swann, a
social psychologist based at the University of Texas at Austin, we designed and
implemented a survey revealing that the more dysphoric (aversive or
distressing) the shared experience of the fighting, the stronger the resulting
identity fusion. To understand the mechanisms in more detail we are currently
carrying out surveys with veterans of the Vietnam War, members of university
fraternities and sororities who have undergone painful or humiliating hazing
rituals, mothers who had particularly traumatic birthing experiences, survivors
of disasters, and other groups that are formed around shared experiences of
suffering.
Dysphoric rituals (such as painful initiations, ascetic ordeals, or severe
forms of penance) are a bit like coming under fire in a warzone, but perhaps
more powerfully bonding. By definition they are ‘causally opaque‘ meaning
that they can be interpreted in a seemingly infinite variety of ways: it’s not
clear how the actions one performs lead, through a causal chain of events, to
any outcomes, so there’s a lot of room for speculation and rumination. Unlike a
car crash or even a traumatic experience on the battlefield, which provokes a
rather limited array of reflections (who was to blame, why me, etc), the range
of interpretations that one can place on a dysphoric ritual experience is more
open-ended. Indeed, the sense of its significance can actually increase over
time, rather than decay. In communal rituals we observe others undergoing
the same experience, and can imagine them sharing the same rich interpretive
process afterwards. The forces shaping one’s own uniquely personal
experiences are felt to be shared by a special cohort of others, causing group
members who have undergone these rituals to ‘fuse’.
That’s one of our hypotheses, at least. In a series of experiments using
artificial rituals and varying levels of arousal (intensity of feeling) we have
shown that, after a time delay, the volume and specificity of interpretive
reflection on the rituals is greater among participants in a high-arousal
condition than for controls (Richert et al. 2005). Similar effects have been
found using field studies, by systematically comparing the interpretive richness
of people’s accounts of rituals involving variable levels of arousal. The
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impression of sharing subtle or hidden meanings of the ritual experience is
thought to contribute to high levels of identity fusion among participants. We
call this the ‘imagistic mode’ of group cohesion (Whitehouse 2004).

Shared Identity in the Big Religions
Although the sharing of especially salient and memorable experiences seems to
play an important role in identity fusion, this does not seem to be such an
important feature of social identification and the categorical ties on which this
is based. Social identification is more like a badge or a uniform that we can put
on and take off at will. Whereas the building blocks of the personal self are
internally generated states (e.g. emotions, memories, and reflections), social
identities are acquired from the world around us. The sense of likeness this
produces can be compelling but it doesn’t penetrate our sense of self to the
same extent or in the same way.
When people participate in the same rituals on a daily or weekly basis, it is
impossible for them to recall the details of every occasion. Instead they
represent the rituals and their meanings as types of behavior—a Holy
Communion or a call to prayer, for instance. Psychologists describe these
representations as ‘procedural scripts’ and ‘semantic schemas’. Scripts and
schemas specify what typically happens in a given ritual and what is generally
thought to be its significance. In a group whose identity markers are composed
mainly of scripts and schemas, what it means to be a member of the tradition
is generalized beyond people of our acquaintance, applying to everyone who
performs similar acts and holds similar beliefs. This route to the construction
of communal identity, based on routinization of rituals and other behaviours,
appears to be a necessary condition for the emergence of imagined
communities — large populations sharing a common tradition and capable of
behaving as a coalition in interactions with non-members, despite the fact that
no individual in the community could possibly know all the others, or even
hope to meet all of them in the course of a lifetime.
Routinization may have other important effects as well. For instance, it
allows very complex networks of doctrines and narratives to be learned and
stored in collective memory, making it relatively easy to spot unauthorized
innovations. Moreover, routinization seems to suppress reflection, in effect
producing more slavish conformity to group norms. Part of the reason may be
that, having achieved procedural fluency, one no longer needs to reflect on
how to perform the ritual, and this in turn makes one less likely to reflect on
why one should perform it. Thus routinization would seem to aid the
transmission of doctrinal orthodoxies, which are traditions of belief and
practice that are relatively immune to innovation and in which unintended
285
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deviation from the norm is readily detectable. We call this the ‘doctrinal mode’
of group cohesion (Whitehouse 2004).

Local and Extended Fusion
So far, both in our experiments and in our studies of dysphoric rituals in the
real world, we have focused our attention mainly on rituals in small face-toface groups. This ‘local fusion’ may have its evolutionary roots in psychological
kinship, where shared experience acted as a proxy for genetic relatedness. Our
central hypothesis is that the belief that someone else shares and so truly
understands your suffering blurs the boundary between yourself and that other
person. But while this can be true among people who witness each other’s
trials and tribulations it can also be extended by less direct routes, for example
by means of especially compelling narratives. To the extent that Jesus of
Nazareth’s sufferings on the cross can be convincingly equated with our own
sufferings it may even be possible to fuse with a person who lived thousands of
years ago.
Fusion can also be extended to larger groups and ideologies — and not
always in ways we would want. Consider the highly ritualized and emotional
gatherings organized at Nuremberg by Hitler and his cronies. During these
dark days ordinary Germans were swept up in a tide of nationalistic fervor
rooted in shared ritual experiences. Nevertheless, Hitler’s rallies were too big
for all those attending to have known each other personally. There was also a
strong doctrinal aspect that is normally lacking in dysphoric rituals: Hitler was
preaching an ideology that, however repugnant to us now, was hypnotically
seductive to his audiences. Apparently, people were fusing with a belief system
as well as with each other.
Extended fusion of this kind is likely to be different from local fusion. In the
case of Nazis at the Nuremberg rallies, they couldn’t encode all the other
people attending and so couldn’t recognize all of them subsequently.
Somebody might claim to have been present and there might be evidence to
support it but I don’t think this could ever be as psychologically convincing as
actually remembering them being there. Moreover, at least some of the ideas
associated with this kind of experience have an external origin and so are less
intimately connected with the personal self. Recall that one of the hypothesized
features of local fusion is that personal experience, on which my sense of self is
at least partly constructed, provides the main reference point for sharing a
common bond. So extended fusion would seem to be a more tentative kind of
fusion of self and other. Since it depends on external sources as well as direct
personal engagement (e.g. testimony rather than experience) it carries less
conviction.
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You might think that extended fusion is somehow a midway point between
local fusion with known individuals and identification with large anonymous
communities. But this doesn’t seem to be the case – fusion with country, for
example, has all the same hallmark features as fusion with family, making both
kinds of fusion distinct from identification (Swann et el. 2012).

The Social Functions of Ritual, Fusion, and
Identification
Identity fusion could be seen as a form of insurance through investment in
social networks based on relational ties. When the fate of the group is
threatened or uncertain, fused individuals experience increased commitment.
And when a transgressor is identified in the group they might be punished
harshly but they are nevertheless welcomed back into the fold. This kind of
investment in the group is not provided by identification with groups based on
categorical ties. Although there may be some exceptions, when people merely
identify with a group and its status declines, so does commitment to the group.
And since the members of such groups are eminently replaceable,
transgressors can be eliminated (e.g. by exclusion or execution). This means
that the members of fused groups can rely on the group for support even when
times are hard or when one’s reputation has been damaged.
Identity fusion fosters courage and self-sacrifice in the face of external
threats in a way that social identification cannot. When the group is at risk of
predation, members not only band together but individually experience a sense
of enhanced strength, invulnerability, and increased willingness to endorse
acts of outgroup hostility. This means that members of fused groups will be
more formidable adversaries in inter-group conflict, all else being equal.
Prior to the emergence of the doctrinal mode in human prehistory, group
identity was forged largely on the basis of directly shared experiences,
including participation in rituals. Thus, the imagistic mode has long been a
means of generating the impression of shared mental content based on
common experience. With the appearance of more routinized rituals, however,
a new kind of group identity became possible based on semantic schemas and
procedural scripts that could be generalized to any member of the in-group,
even to complete strangers. Simply wearing a certain mode of dress or
hairstyle now revealed a lot about a person’s beliefs and practices. We could
then make inferences on this basis about their trustworthiness, even people we
had never met before.
Routinized rituals provide a foundation for social identification with large
communities, capable of encompassing indefinitely many individuals singing
from the same hymn sheet (literally as well as metaphorically). Expanding the
size of the in- group in this way has implications for the scale on which people
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can engage in cooperative behavior, establishing a basis for cooperation with
strangers simply because they carry the insignia that display shared beliefs and
practices. At the same time, however, ties based on identification fulfill
different social functions from ties based on fusion.
While individuals are only capable of fusing with a small number of groups
(typically two or three at most), it is possible to identify with a great many
different groups. This means we can build a complex division of labour in
which we shift flexibly between roles as changing social situations dictate.
There is no limit on the size of groups with whom identification is possible.
The emergence and spread of the doctrinal mode was facilitated by the
appearance of the first ever regular collective rituals, focused around daily
production and consumption, and the spread of identity markers across larger
populations, for instance in the form of stamp seals used for body decoration
and more standardized pottery designs in the Neolithic Middle East
(Whitehouse and Hodder 2010). The appearance and spread of routinized
rituals seems to have been linked to the need for greater trust and cooperation
when interacting with relative strangers. Consider the difficulties of
persuading people you scarcely know that they should make long-term
investments in your services based on a promise, or should pay taxes or tribute
in return for protection or sustenance in times of need. In the absence of more
detailed information about the trustworthiness of prospective trading partners
or remote governors who promise protection by their militia, shared insignia
proclaiming commitment to common beliefs and practices becomes a
persuasive form of evidence. In such conditions, groups with routinized rituals
capable of uniting large populations will tend to out-compete those who lack
shared identity markers of this kind.

Using Social Glue to Change the World
My three wishes for the world may be granted as a consequence of
understanding better the way social glue works.
The first of my wishes, recall, is to repair societies torn apart by civil war.
People fight and die for the group because they are glued to each other in a
particularly powerful way. True, people can be forced to fight on pain of torture
or execution but coercion alone is a weak and unstable way of running an
army. In a smoke-filled room in Misrata surrounded by eager young men with
assault rifles, the head of the revolutionary forces looked intently at me from
under his camouflaged cap: “I trained many soldiers for Gaddafi before I
trained the men in this room,” he said. “And I tell you that one civilian who
believes in the cause and will die for his comrades is more deadly than ten
soldiers who kill for a wage.”
288
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One of the most powerful binding agents in the military may turn out to be
shared dysphoria – the experience of enduring hardships together, whether in
hazing rituals, grueling forms of training, or the experience of coming under
fire. For thousands of years tribal groups seem to have exploited this
mechanism by using terrifying and painful initiations to fuse together their
fighting units and raiding parties. In civil conflicts the outgroup is not always
the tribe next door – sometimes it is an organ of the state, such as the British
army on Bloody Sunday or the Egyptian police at the beginning of the Arab
Spring. But whoever the enemy happens to be, what drives us to fight them is
not that they are in the wrong. We may point to this as a rationale but that’s
not what really drives us. If we fought against dictators and thugs simply
because they were in the wrong we’d all be at war, all the time. Rather, when
we fight back against injustice it’s because we believe that its victims share our
suffering. The victims are, in an important sense, one with us. So when we
respond with violence it is little more than self-defense.
Shared dysphoria and the fusion of identities it produces are like an
unexploded bomb – it takes only one careless move, such as an unprovoked
attack by an outgroup, to unleash its lethal force. And so we should treat the
presence of this kind of fusion in a population with the same respect that we
treat a minefield. Just as mines can be detected and safely exploded, it should
be possible also to monitor the fusion levels of communities, identifying those
that could blow at any time, and harnessing their capacities for collective
action in peaceful and consensual ways. That is more or less what happened in
Derry, the site of Bloody Sunday — eventually. But did there need to be years
of sectarian violence and appalling loss of life to make a peace process work? If
this period of civil war could have been predicted surely it would have been
better to begin tackling tribalism and building a more consensual system of
governance before rather than after so many lives were lost?
Learning how to build social cohesion for the betterment of humanity is the
key not only to granting my three wishes but to solving all collective action
problems facing our species. Understanding how social glue works is the first
step. At the moment we have many hypotheses but few hard facts. However,
we are now engaged in a massive programme of research to test our hunches
against the evidence – from the lab, from history, from buried civilizations,
from the internet, from ordinary people going about their lives, and from
soldiers on the battlefield. Our project hopes to unlock the secrets of social
bonding and cooperation in humans. If only we could understand better how
social glue works and what it does, we could harness the passions of the
collective and rebuild the social organization of our species in more globally
consensual ways.
True, we could continue trying to change the world by hunting down
terrorists, bombing dictators, imposing economic sanctions on fundamentalist
289
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states, and playing hardball around negotiating tables. But I believe we can
change the world more, and more lastingly, by first understanding ourselves
better.
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Commentaries
William Swann. How Can Social Glue Foster Cooperation Rather
than Competition? A commentary on Harvey Whitehouse
University of Texas
Corresponding author’s e-mail: swann@utexas.edu
In an audaciously ambitious article, Whitehouse proposes a solution to three of
the world’s perennial problems: (a) predicting, preventing, and resolving civil
wars; (b) channeling social cohesion for the collective good; and (c) mobilizing
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a global response to economic inequality and environmental threat. The
solution, he contends, is to buttress our understanding of something he calls
“social glue”.
On the face of it, the core argument here seems plausible enough. That is,
there is evidence that people who are identified or fused with groups are
disposed to band together with other group members and make significant
sacrifices for the group. Presumably, if one could expand the visions of group
members so that they embraced “humanity” rather than their local group, the
goals that Whitehouse laid out for us would be within reach. But how does one
expand the horizons of group members in this way? Thus far, research has
focused on the ways in which social glue fuels, rather than minimizes, divisions
between people. For example, social identity researchers have repeatedly
demonstrated that highly identified persons are biased toward the ingroup and
against the outgroup, even when membership in the group is completely
arbitrary. Similarly, the identity fusion literature has demonstrated that highly
fused persons endorse fighting and dying for the ingroup against the outgroup.
Such evidence suggests that social glue may contribute to intergroup
competition and violence rather than cooperation and peace.
If I were looking for ways to make social glue foster cooperation rather
competition, I might look in two places. Within the social psychological
literature, Sheriff’s (1955) classic Robber’s Cave experiment showed that
intergroup rivalry could be overcome by inducing rival groups to pursue the
same superordinate goal. In a field experiment at a summer camp for boys, the
researchers engineered a situation in which the only way for two groups of
boys to achieve their goals was to cooperate with the rival group. Once the boys
realized that they could achieve their own goals only by cooperating with a
group they viewed as rivals, they set aside their differences and began working
together. Soon, the barriers that had divided members of the two groups
melted away and their relationships blossomed. Apparently, superordinate
goals represent one means of fostering social glue.
For additional strategies for fostering social glue, I would look at Steven
Pinker’s (2011) book, The Better Angels of Our Nature. Pinker argues that the
rates of violence in the world have declined precipitously over the course of
human history. He attributes this decline to several factors, the most
important one being the rise of the modern state, which suppresses violence
and settles disputes among its citizens. In this instance, the modern state does
not directly foster social glue. Rather, by regulating behaviors that are known
to foster suspicion, distrust, and violence, the modern state creates conditions
that favor the development of glue among its members.
Pinker also identifies several additional methods through which societies
have fostered social glue, including the empowerment of women, increases in
literacy and communication, and the rise of international trade. Much like
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superordinate goals, these factors have produced increases in empathy and
better understanding of members of other groups, both of which may foster
social glue.
In Pinker’s scenario, then, the monumental changes he depicts came about
through both indirect and direct strategies working together: strong
government to prevent or punish destructive behaviors and social
psychological processes such as super-ordinate goals that serve to bind people
together. Working together, such processes may produce the social glue that
encourage the better angels of our nature to emerge.

References
Pinker, S. (2011). The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined.
Sherif, M. (1956). Experiments in group conflict. Scientific American, 195, 5458.

Gordon Ingram1 and Karolina Prochownik.2 The Notion of
“Identity Fusion” Raises More Questions Than It Answers. A
Commentary on Harvey Whitehouse
1 Bath

Spa University
University
Corresponding author’s e-mail: g.ingram@bathspa.ac.uk
2 Jagiellonian

In his target article Whitehouse describes a fascinating and extremely
worthwhile program of research. We understand that this research is in its
early stages, and so we are not too concerned that at the moment, his
exposition of it raises many more questions for us than it answers. We offer up
these questions, not really as criticisms, but more to help him communicate
the value of his project by attempting to answer them in the future.
1. How prevalent is identity fusion?
The concept of identity fusion is introduced without any data (either
here or – less forgivably – in the fuller treatment of the concept by
Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012) on how common
a phenomenon it is, whether it takes place equally in men and women,
the age at which it first takes place, etc. Without such data it is
impossible to draw any conclusions on whether identity fusion is part
of normal human development, or a localized reaction to extreme social
circumstances. Hence, it is very difficult to assess its importance for
human cooperation.
2. How is identity fusion distinguished from social identification?
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Whitehouse: Social Evolution Forum. Cliodynamics 4.2 (2013)
Whitehouse implies that identity fusion is logically distinct from social
identification, because in the latter process the personal and social
selves have a mutually inhibitory relationship, whereas in the former
they have a complementary relationship. Yet social identification tends
to be defined in very broad terms, simply as a feeling of belonging to a
certain social category (Swann et al., 2012). Presumably, it is a
prerequisite for feeling fused with a certain category that one should
also feel that one belongs to that category. Therefore, identity fusion is
not logically distinct from social identification, but an extreme form of
social identification characterized by an abnormal relationship between
the personal and social selves. Furthermore, it ought to be
acknowledged that the personal and social selves are not as distinct,
even in non-fused individuals, as Whitehouse suggests. The social self
implies certain internal states (e.g., commitment to a social role,
feelings of duty or obligation, feelings of guilt or shame), while the
development of a ‘personal’ self relies on various kinds of information
supplied by the social world, in forms such as internalized narratives
(Vygotsky, 1986) and social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954).
3. How does identity fusion relate to other motivations for altruism?
Identity fusion is clearly not the only motivation for cooperative or
humanitarian behaviour; yet Whitehouse occasionally comes close to
claiming this, with statements like:
“when we fight back against injustice it’s because we believe that its
victims share our suffering. The victims are, in an important sense, one
with us. So when we respond with violence it is little more than selfdefense.”
This ignores the fact that many humans have an abstract, and
probably innate, sense of justice (Walsh, 2000), which potentially
applies equally to all other humans – or at least all other citizens –
regardless of the extent to which one feels “fused” with them. (Was the
heroism of the Fukushima nuclear workers really dependent on the fact
that it was co-nationals who were the principal beneficiaries? Is it not
more likely that as the only people qualified and on hand to deal with
the crisis, they felt a sense of moral duty to humanity, and indeed the
environment?) Proponents of identity fusion theory need to
acknowledge that cooperation, cohesion and even self-sacrifice can all
be achieved without any feelings of fusion: the latter just makes them
more likely.
4. Why are shared trauma and dysphoric rituals believed to be so
important for identity fusion?
Whitehouse clearly believes that shared trauma is vital for promoting
identity fusion. However, while he offers anecdotal evidence that
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trauma is a sufficient condition for fusion, he supplies no evidence that
it is a necessary condition. A lot of the empirical research on identity
fusion has taken place on individuals who have not in fact suffered any
serious collective trauma (e.g. the Spanish participants of Gómez et al.,
2011). Similarly, events such as the Nuremberg rallies, which
Whitehouse holds partially responsible for the high levels of identity
fusion that were presumably characteristic of Nazi Germany, were not
dysphoric but rather euphoric occasions. Thus it may be that it is high
levels of emotional activation in general, not just activation of negative
emotions, that are important. If trauma is not necessary for building
social cohesion, we are left with the question of why it is necessary to
have dysphoric rituals at all. One possibility is that they are a kind of
test of how group members will behave under genuinely dangerous
conditions (which would explain why they are so characteristic of
initiation rituals).
5. What are the key differences between fusing with a small group of
known others (what Whitehouse describes as “local fusion”) and
fusing with a large, impersonal group such as a nation or a religion?
The target article does not explore the differences between the “local”
and “extended” forms of identity fusion. We are sceptical that these
really represent the same kind of process. Analyzing affiliation to an
abstract category of nation or religion in terms of fusion with a vast
group of unknown others seems problematic, because in such cases it is
really the ideas that define the group, rather than vice versa. The group
of one’s co-religionists, for example, tends to be defined subjectively as
the set of all those who follow the principles of one’s religion correctly.
People who socially identify with a particular religion but who are
perceived as violating certain “sacred values” (Atran & Axelrod, 2008)
of that religion will not be seen by the perceiver as fused with them;
indeed, extremists’ most bilious outpourings of hate are often reserved
for such individuals. Atran’s (2010) study of Islamic extremists is more
sophisticated than simply relying on identity fusion, because it
explicitly takes into account the interactions between young men’s
social commitments to their comrades in arms, and their ideological
commitments to the sacred values of their shared religion.
6. How exactly can an examination of the ‘social glue’ produced by
shared trauma be used to solve major social problems?
Whitehouse proposes – without going into many details – that when we
better understand the social glue of identity fusion we may learn to use
it for peace. Yet if identity fusion is most likely to occur in the case of
shared traumatic experiences (including dysphoric rituals), is it
possible for it to work in circumstances devoid of any sort of trauma?
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Will we need to inflict simulated trauma on ourselves in order to
achieve collective fusion, and therefore peace? In this respect it may be
fortunate that collective trauma does not in fact seem to be necessary
for identity fusion (see Question 4). But another problem is that it will
be very difficult, if not impossible, ever to achieve identity fusion with
people who hold different sacred values from our own (see Question 5).
Perhaps, if these questions were answered satisfactorily, we would be more
convinced of the unique value of identity fusion in explaining altruistic
behaviour. As things stand, it seems more plausible to us that identity fusion is
simply an extreme form of social identification (see Question 2), which
naturally predicts extreme forms of social commitment (such as laying down
one’s life for one’s countrymen) better than does simply stating whether one
belongs to a particular social category.
Yet Whitehouse’s article is valuable in that it draws attention to the
parallels between affiliation to small groups and affiliation to big cultural
ideas. Perhaps, rather than invoking a specific construct of identity fusion, we
may account for these parallels by falling back on the construct that inspired
much of the work on social identification and identity fusion: that of
attachment (Bowlby, 1969). There may indeed be a difference between groups
to which we merely feel that we belong in an abstract sense (social
identification), and those to which we also feel that we really belong (are
attached) in an emotional sense. Attachment broadens considerably during
childhood and adolescence as we become less dependent on close family
members, and more dependent on first peers and then sexual partners.
Although speculative, one possibility is that during a certain sensitive period in
adolescence and early adulthood, it is also possible to become strongly
attached to an idea (such as nationality or religion). It may be that reflection
on dysphoric (or indeed euphoric) shared experiences plays a key role in this
new attachment process.
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There is much to admire in Whitehouse’s ambitious programme of
research. There is the testing of a theory that offers greater precision in
describing and explaining social cohesion. There is the formulation of an
account of psychological kinship that can serve as a reminder that cultural and
evolutionary approaches can work together to produce compelling
insights. And there is the sense that, with such interdisciplinary collaboration,
we stand on the verge of unprecedented progress in understanding the human
condition. Yet, while we can appreciate Whitehouse’s three wishes for the
world, the move from descriptive to normative discourse faces significant
ethical and practical challenges, necessitating a fourth wish.
Whitehouse’s essay makes clear that the theory of divergent modes of
religiosity (Whitehouse 2001; 2004) is not so much a theory of religion but of
social cohesion, and has important implications beyond organizations
employing non-physical agent concepts, such as civil war armed groups
(Whitehouse and McQuinn 2013). Sharing traumatic experiences forges
intense bonds through psychological kinship while frequent repetition of
semantic information produces less intense but more diffuse bonds of ethnic
or pseudo-ethnic affiliation. This is progress both for the theory itself and for
the field of the cognitive science of religion in that one of its theories has
demonstrated a much wider significance for our understanding of societies.
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We often speak of the necessity and benefits of interdisciplinarity in the
study of human life, but we also often face entrenched disciplinary boundaries
and antipathy (Pinker 2002; McKinnon and Silverman 2005). Whitehouse’s
account of identity fusion as ‘psychological kinship’ (Swann et al 2012), which
lies at the heart of the imagistic mode of cohesion (Lanman and Whitehouse in
prep), utilizes the findings of both evolutionary psychology and socio-cultural
anthropology and can serve as a reminder of the insights we can reach when
we move past the more exclusionist rhetoric sometimes used by scholars in
these fields.
Evolutionary psychologists have provided evidence of the importance of
contextual cues, especially early co-residence, in the psychological perception
of kinship and the altruistic dispositions that follow (Lieberman, Tooby et al.
2007; Lieberman and Lobel 2012). Socio-cultural anthropologists have
provided evidence of the construction of kinship ties through specific
contextual processes, such as shared residence and eating (Carsten 2004). The
available evidence from both fields tells us that human beings use fallible
heuristic cues to determine likely genetic relatives for the purposes of altruism
and incest avoidance. Whitehouse’s insight is that traumatic rituals can
provide these cues and produce in participants the impression that they share
essential parts of themselves with other people; they can effectively make kin
and they can do so in a much shorter timespan than co-residence. If this claim
is borne out by ongoing research, we will have demonstrated that insights of
frequently opposed fields can be utilized together to make substantial progress
in understanding one of the foundational topics of anthropology.
With such progress in our understanding of the human condition, however,
come important questions about the uses of such understanding. Whitehouse
presents a relatively uncomplicated and optimistic picture with his three
wishes. Once we understand how social glue operates among human beings,
we will be able to defuse violent movements and fuse billions of people with
the notion of ‘humanity’, allowing us to solve the problems of poverty and
climate change. I can appreciate this vision but I believe that anytime one
seeks to follow Marx in not just understanding the world but changing it (not
to mention changing it for all of humanity!), one must face serious questions
and challenges. Whitehouse argues : “The more we understand these
mechanisms the more we can do to curtail sectarian violence, genocide, and
many other forms of civil conflict.” This assumes a ‘we’ that judges which civil
wars to put down and which to support. Who is included in this ‘we’? How
representative of the diverse moral visions of humanity will ‘we’ be? How
worthy of trust?
Similarly, Whitehouse argues that it would be beneficial for people to fuse
with the concept of “humanity” as a whole. “Humanity” is a relatively recent
and universalizing identity term that potentially devalues existing ethnic and
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religious identities, identities that both activists and many socio-cultural
anthropologists view themselves as championing in a fight against
globalization and cultural homogenization. What is the content of this vision
of ‘humanity’ with which people are to fuse? What is it to be a human
being? Who has a seat at the table in deciding the content of this vision? If we
unreflectively assume the contemporary idealistic Western notion of humanity
as a rational species working toward a world of individual freedom and mutual
benefit (Taylor 2007), then other visions of humanity and its place in the world
are marginalized. We must be careful to demonstrate the differences between
such a project and the enterprises of colonialism and the neo-liberal push of
global capitalism, not just for obvious ethical reasons but also for the practical
reason that socio-cultural anthropologists are needed for cross-cultural
research on the topics addressed here and one risks alienating many of them
with a vision of global transformation and unification.
For these reasons I would ask Whitehouse to consider asking the genie for a
fourth wish. This wish would be to make the process of establishing the
content of our vision of ‘humanity’ globally peaceful, representative, and
consensual. This, however, may be the hardest wish for our genie to grant.
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Whitehouse’s article on social cohesion provides a mix of research agenda and
aspirational vision. The research agenda springs from the “Ritual, Community,
and Conflict” project that he directs, but Whitehouse also aspires to employ an
advanced understanding of social cohesion to “predict, prevent, and resolve
civil wars,” and to “mobilize a global response to economic inequality and
environmental threat.” As a student of social group dynamics I would be
excited to see Whitehouse and colleagues succeed in this regard, however
fraught the task. The forces of social cohesion are critical in explaining social
change and thereby provide stepping-stones to applying our understanding to
higher social goals. With these goals in mind, I would like to consider how the
types of social cohesion Whitehouse tables might influence societal evolution,
and if and how such forces might be employed for a common good.
Before I start I would like to dispense with an issue of which Whitehouse is
certainly very aware yet did not address in the target article, namely that the
forces of social cohesion and those of social diversification are merely opposite
sides of the same psychological coin. Theoretical and empirical research bears
this out. Evolutionary theory shows that when the benefits of cooperation can
be isolated to the same group that pays its costs, cooperation is more likely to
arise and persist. Countless empirical studies demonstrate that human
cooperation is obsessively group focused, suggesting that in-group favoritism,
parochial altruism, conditional reciprocity and related behaviors are the sorts
of adaptations that have made human cooperation stable and human societies
successful over evolutionary time. Cultural group selection provides a succinct
and efficient way of tracking the evolutionary linkages between individuals and
groups, and it is of direct relevance to the evolution of cooperation, ritual and
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institution. I believe this broad region of group-centric cooperation, cultural
evolution and adapted human psychology to be the relevant context for
interpretation of Whitehouse’s article, and will return to the implications at the
end.

On types of social glue
Whitehouse outlines two different mechanisms of social cohesion, identity
fusion and social identification. Identity fusion is a personal, emotional bond
shared by small groups that have undergone intense and stressful shared
experiences such as wars and initiation rituals. Groups of individuals who
have passed together through such events tend to have deep empathy for one
another. These groups are often willing to sacrifice to aid and protect their
fellows. This personal identity fusion differs in nearly every respect from
symbolic “social identification,” which does not require intense personal
experiences but is instead mediated by categorical relationships, rote ritual,
symbolic markings and may extend across vast social groups much larger than
could possibly undergo personal identity fusion. While these symbolically
marked social identities may include millions of individuals, they do so only
weakly in comparison to the strength of commitment between people who
have experienced intense shared events and become fused. As a result,
individuals may belong to great number of symbolic social identities, whereas,
people only ever have one or a few personal identity fusions.
Personal identity fusion and symbolic social identification are, of course,
categories of convenience created to simplify the empirical world. Although
they are extreme categories, with large grey zones and complex interactions,
they are useful ones. They are useful because they expose distinct social
properties in a manner that makes it easier to understand how societies change
over time. Moreover, it seems that the two mechanisms of cohesion are not
merely two extremes on a continuum, but, as can be seen in their links with
euphoric vs. dysphoric ritual and imagistic vs. doctrinal social forms (Atkinson
& Whitehouse, 2011; Whitehouse, 2002), the two mechanisms are also
separable objects of empirical study.
To aid in considering the dynamical properties of these two social cohesion
mechanisms (in preparation for building a theoretical model), it is useful to
abstract or exaggerate their core differences. The purpose here is to consider
the properties of two pure types of glue, so that we may consider their
application, interactions and dynamical properties more clearly. I see five
dimensions along which these two mechanisms of social cohesion differ, at
least in theory.
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Group size – Symbolic social identity may extend to millions of strangers,
while personal identity fusion may only occur within relatively small groups
with whom it is directly possible to share an experience.
Exclusivity – Humans may simultaneously belong to many social groups,
each symbolically marked in various ways, but seldom undergo identity fusion
and when they do it is an exclusive formation, not usually open to further
members.
Cooperative strength – Both fused identities and social identities carry the
capacity to elicit altruism and cooperation from group members, but the
individuals whose identities have been ‘fused’ are usually willing to sacrifice
more for their fellows than are individuals of the same large social group.
Symbolic membership – Social identities are often denoted with special
symbols and language, or social markers. Social markers and other outward
cues of belonging may be imitated or used strategically for the benefit of
individuals and groups. Fused personal identities, on the other hand, derive
membership from involvement in the defining event, and may not be imitated
or manipulated as easily because members recognize each other personally.
Primary driver – Fused groups emerge largely as a consequence of
traumatic events (be they ritual, catastrophe or war), while symbolic social
identities arise, persist and spread through a combination of social processes
including cultural diffusion and institutional dynamics.
Before coming to rest on the dynamical aspects, I will make a few notes
about these two mechanisms. Personal identity fusion is by its nature
inversely related to group size and physical distance, but positively related to
catastrophe, conflict and death. While dysphoric hazing and initiation rituals
make personal identity fusion a force that can be employed by societies and
institutions, it is significant that in peacetime most of the fusion events that a
person
experiences
may
be
exogenous
to
symbolic
social
groupings. Childhood, the physical challenge of survival and intra-group
conflict likely provide the majority share of fusion events in peacetime, and
many of these events occur frequently and perpetually in human life. This
background frequency provides an important baseline of regional social
cohesion against which the effects of ritual and institution and fusion due to
inter-group conflict may be compared. Furthermore, it is possible that above a
certain frequency of intense events even a large population may become
“fused,” in a chainmail fashion. Such a linkage could enable warfare or
peaceful collective action such as the civil rights movement.
By contrast, the symbolic markers of social identity may be used
strategically by group members and outsiders alike. Symbolic markers are ripe
material for cultural evolutionary processes. Social identity markers may
often arise endogenously (Efferson, Lalive, & Fehr, 2008), are prone to
psychological mechanisms of imitation (Mesoudi, 2009), and are strengthened
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at social group boundaries (McElreath, Boyd, & Richerson, 2003). Moreover,
symbolic social identities such as those that designate large religious
populations may have played a key role in the expansion of human cooperation
in the last 10,000 years (Henrich et al., 2010). Thus, symbolic social identity
would seem to be more directly susceptible to cultural evolutionary forces than
fused personal identities, even when dysphoric fusion rituals are accounted
for.

On mixing glues
To explore the dynamic influences of these types of social cohesion, it may be
most instructive to explore a few of their possible interactions.
First, the two cohesive forces may often align. Alignment occurs when
fusion events occur within a population delimited by its symbolic social
identity. The amount of personal fusion occurring within a symbolic group
may in fact be a more useful way to conceptualize social resilience. Ibn
Khaldun called collective solidarity within a group asabiyya, and Turchin
(2003) extended and enriched Khaldun’s theory of the growth and decline of
empires by creating mathematical models of the interaction between asabiyya,
populations, and political boundaries. Khaldun’s verbal model and Turchin’s
mathematical models suggest that asabiyya was strongest within small social
groups and on social boundaries. Successful groups grow in population and
space until they create vast cultural heartlands within which social
homogeneity allows asabiyya to wane due to a lack of contact with other social
groups. Eventually, an over-extended empire may collapse and be replaced by
one that emerges from border areas. Mapping our two glues onto this pattern,
asabiyya becomes the frequency or strength of personal identity fusion
occurring within a symbolic social group. In small social groups and
borderlands it is more likely that fusion events will involve interactions with
other social identities, and thereby come to reinforce the strength of the
existing symbolic boundaries. In ethnic heartlands, symbolic differentiation is
low and thus cannot drive fusion events. Any fusion events that do occur will
not occur across symbolic social boundaries, because there are none, and the
personal fusion component of collective solidarity wanes.
Next, the two types of social glue may compete on various time scales. In a
related interview, Whitehead suggests that rituals employing the two types of
social cohesion may be competing over evolutionary time as design features in
social systems (Jones, 2013). He states that low frequency intense rituals have
been eliminated in modern social groups because they are powerful and
destabilize larger social structures. This may be because symbolic social
identities grow to include very large populations, and may control a larger
share of observed cohesion. Symbolic social identities are also more prone to
302

Whitehouse: Social Evolution Forum. Cliodynamics 4.2 (2013)
cultural evolutionary forces than are fusion events and rituals. It may be then
that the corpus of beliefs and customs that compose a large society tends to
become dominated more by the types of rituals that can be easily transmitted
and imitated, causing symbolic social identities to grow by contrast to
personally fused identities.
Or, it may be that for the same reasons, practices exploiting symbolic
cohesion spread fast while those exploiting identity fusion cohesion spread
slowly. This last possibility would predict a U-shaped relationship between the
fraction of cohesion that derives from identity fusion and time as symbolic
processes at first outstrip fusion processes, which then eventually regain.
These speculative interactions between the two types of social cohesion and
between the associated types of ritual may be tested theoretically (with
models) and empirically (as Whitehouse is doing currently). Related research
questions include:
 What is the baseline frequency of personal fusion events in peaceful
times?
 What is the maximum group size that can hold a fusion event?
 What frequency of smaller fusion events is necessary to create the
chainmail-like effect, or asabiyya?
 What is the difference in cooperative strength between identify fusion
and symbolic identification when measured experimentally?
 Does the average correlation between fusion and symbolic identity (i.e.
asabiyya) tend to vary across social scales, and if so, which scale leads
to most cohesion, and which scale minimizes the chances of war?
 What measures of “social scale” are most relevant (e.g. population size,
social network measures, etc)?
 What factors control the long-term evolutionary interactions between
the dysphoric rituals that generate identity fusion and the more
frequent scripted doctrinal rituals that help secure symbolic
identification?

On applying social glues
The aspirational content of Whitehouse’s article is, of course, hopeful in the
extreme. Even ignoring the ethical black hole it conjures, we do not know if
social cohesion can be effectively manipulated at all, let alone to positive social
outcomes. But Whitehouse asks the right question, and I believe his categories
of glue can be used constructively. So, how might one hypothetically apply the
forces of social cohesion to constructive societal outcomes? I have two
comments in this regard.
First, how might we use this knowledge to avoid war? If Whitehouse is
correct that symbolic social cohesion has enabled the expansion of human
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society, then we should look to applying it for its more inclusive properties
over the more exclusive and local process of identity fusion. However, we must
always expect that at least a baseline level of fusion cohesion will occur. Also,
the situation to be most avoided is when identity fusion events unfold across
symbolic social identity boundaries, building social tension. This condition is
often a precursor to revolution or war, and always a consequence. Therefore,
societies should avoid situations where fusion events occur across symbolic
social identity boundaries. The problem is boiling this mechanism down to a
tip – to stop war, stop people of different social groups from fighting each
other – makes mighty weak tea. Perhaps, as the research matures, Whitehouse
will be in a better position to elaborate.
Finally, we return to the proper context – the evolution of cooperation,
group functional rituals and cultural traits. As I mentioned earlier, there is
abundant evidence that the evolved human capacities for social cohesion are
tightly tied with the human proclivity to mark, segregate and discriminate
between people of different types. When we think of glue, we think of applying
it to hold things together. The problem with social glue, however, is that it
binds one sub-population at the expense of a rift in the larger population. That
is, neither type of social glue necessarily generates new, additional
cohesion. Rather, human social cohesion seems to act in more of a
thermodynamic way, extracting cohesion from one source and accumulating it
in another. It seems better to me to approach application from a more
fundamental level, when we ask the question, “what factors can retard the
processes of social segregation or ethnogenesis?” or “which mechanisms add to
total cohesion across social groups?” Two such mechanisms may be migration
(Richerson & Boyd, 2008) and economic equality (Baland, Bardhan, & Bowles,
2007; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).
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I am quite enthusiastic about Whitehouse’s research program, an impressive
body of empirical work in a variety of cultural contexts and using multiple
methods, exploring diverging modes of religiosity and ritual practice and their
implications for social structure. I’m delighted to have been asked to respond
to his post.
I find Whitehouse’s divergent modes hypothesis of ritual function and
social structure both intuitively reasonable and well supported. There are a lot
of complexities still to be explained, but a good start has been made on what is
likely to be a long and fruitful research project. I’ll confine my response to this
specific post to three points. The first, an expansion of something I wrote in
response to an earlier post on this blog, which is to address the problematic
nature of the rather loose term ‘ritual’ as used historically by anthropologists
and to assert that ‘causally opaque’ is not a useful definition of ‘ritual’. The
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second is to suggest an expansion of the divergent modes of religiosity
program to include synthesis with the study of how people behave and make
decisions around values constructed as ‘sacred’. The final point I would like to
make is actually a word of caution around the development of more
sophisticated techniques of social control. Whitehouse presents here a positive
picture of how this knowledge could be applied without addressing how
different actors with different access to power and different motivations might
use such knowledge for other ends than the public good.
As I began my own research on ‘ritual’ at UC Davis, I immediately came up
against the problem of definition with which many others have wrestled. I find
it hard to argue that the anthropological record is coherent around the
definition of the term ‘ritual’, except perhaps the Durkheimian idea of those
things that we Westerners don’t know how to explain through obvious
material/economic purpose.
‘Ritual’ is a folk category. It is a box in which we lump all sorts of interesting
behaviors which grab our attention, yet whose purpose is not materially
obvious to ourselves, the anthropologists doing the studying. It is like the
kitchen junk drawer in which you put all sorts of things that you don’t already
have a place for. There are a lot of interesting things in the junk drawer, but
their only relation to each other is that they don’t fit in our other tidy
categories… they are ‘causally opaque’ to us. As such, I don’t think there is
much hope for some sort of general theory of ‘ritual’ per se. Some researchers
find a functional role for ritual in the formation and stability of groups at
different scales (Atkinson & Whitehouse, 2011)(Barth, 1990)(McNeill,
1995)(Sosis & Bressler, 2003)(McElreath, Boyd, & Richerson, 2003), others
assert that rituals destabilize large hierarchical structures (Ehrenriech, 2007),
others demonstrate how rituals store locally specific functional ecological
knowledge (Lansing & Kremer, 1993)(Rappaport, 1967), yet others find ritual
to cause cognitive dysfunction (Legare & Souza, 2012), and on and on. They
are all perhaps correct, but this is arguably because they have drawn distinct
objects out of the conceptual box we call ‘ritual’. There are a lot of interesting
objects in this box, but I suspect it is going to be much more fruitful to then
explore theories of the different, specific social ‘objects’ in this box than to try
to argue for a general theory of those things which are causally opaque to the
anthropologist performing the study. While Whitehouse still refers to this
definition, I actually think it is one of the interesting things about his research
program that it begins to differentiate objects in the box based on features
other than opacity to the researcher. For example, as Atkinson and
Whitehouse get more specific about euphoric/dysphoric activities, frequency,
arousal level, they find correlations in the ethnographic literature between low
frequency and high arousal ‘rituals’ and small scale societies and between high
frequency low arousal rituals and larger scale societies. Getting similarly more
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specific, McNeil and also Kirschner and Tomasello (Kirschner & Tomasello,
2010) find that synchronized rhythmic activity leads to increased prosociality
(likely in-group limited). This will be entirely unrelated to the social or
psychological effects of an augury ritual that does not involve synchronized
movement, like drawing a card from a deck and reflecting on one’s life in
relationship to its imagery. We find both activities in the folk category of
‘ritual’, but there isn’t much more that unifies them except the common
perception of their mysterious function from the perspective of a cultural
outsider.
The category ‘ritual’ reflects less on the unity of the phenomena in the
category than on the cognitive biases of those creating the category, Heinrich
et al’s WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic)
people (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). WEIRD people, who have
dominated not just anthropology, but western academia in general, are
psychologically shaped by a culturally novel mythology of radical individualism
which perhaps renders opaque the social psychology of many different
activities, which to others may be obvious from both internal experience and
observed patterns of behavior in their communities. To whom, if anyone, is the
activity supposed to be ‘causally opaque’ to be called a ritual? Is the causal
opacity somehow necessary for the function?
A perhaps more fundamental problem with trying to find a theory of ‘ritual’
using this definition of ‘obscurity of function’ as one’s definition is that the
behavior of interest might not be confined to the box. For example, McNeil
points out that some synchronized rhythmic activities, like folk dances or
certain religious practices, have no clear economic purpose to the outsider
(and thus tend to be called ‘rituals’), but others are parts of functional
economic activity, like Japanese fishermen rhythmically pulling in a net or
military drills. Their purpose to an outsider is causally clear, but they have the
same psychological effects as the more causally opaque variants. One might
say that there is a layering of the obvious and the obscure with the fishermen,
however the fishermen are likely quite aware of the social effects of their
activities… it is hard to miss from the inside, the experience of camaraderie
that comes with team work. As McNeil points out, the social function of the
close order drill has certainly been clear to military professionals who
continued its use well past the point in history when it’s material training
function was no longer relevant.
One could point to many groups who use synchronized activities with no
sense of ‘obscurity of purpose’, very intentionally using the practice to bond
groups. Modern military drills, Native American powwow or potlatch dances,
and allegiance-forming dance events in Papua New Guinea are a few quick
examples. Goebbels’ social choreography at Nuremberg was certainly not
causally opaque to Goebbels, but was done quite explicitly with an
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understanding of group formation. It was also probably not causally opaque to
those involved, and many are struck in a visceral way with an obviousness of
social function when watching Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will. ‘Ritual’ is
best seen as a conceptual grab bag in which we can find specific behaviors like
high arousal dysphoric activities or synchronized rhythmic activities to study
and about which to create social and psychological theories. I suspect that a
general theory of ritual is bound to either fail or not be usefully specific in its
predictions. Whitehouse has demonstrated that theories of high arousal
dysphoric activities and low arousal, repetitive activities have significant
promise.
The second point I would like to make is a suggestion of what may turn out
to be a very useful research question: how do different ritual forms bring
participants to categorize specific rhetorical stances or norms as ‘sacred’?
When something is seen as ‘sacred’ people’s behavior in relation to that thing
becomes qualitatively different from other contexts: behavior becomes more
unbending (Rappaport, 1999). Where the ‘profane’ may be subject to tradeoffs and negotiation, conflicts around the sacred potentially become
irreconcilable, or at least not subject to normal notions of economic trade-offs
(Atran, 2010). In today’s world, we see many politically important examples
where different groups’ notions of the sacred come into conflict, causing
violent conflict and a consequent entrenching of stances.
While we are beginning to understand how ‘sacredness’ affects decisionmaking and negotiation, we have hardly begun to look at how a notion of the
sacred arises in the first place. I suspect that there will be some very fruitful
explorations in the next years that will help shed light on how people become
bonded not just to other people but to ideas. As Whitehouse writes about
‘fusing with a belief system’ and how ‘routinization seems to suppress
reflection, in effect producing more slavish conformity to group norms’, it is
very easy to extrapolate to the manufacturing of the sacred through a synthesis
of group ritual and rhetoric. Sacred values are characterized by an
unquestionability, an inhibition of critically reflection. If we can find empirical
support for the idea that specific kinds of routinization lead to suppression of
reflection (and perhaps this already exists in the research of Whitehouse and
his colleagues), we may have the beginning of an understanding of the
dynamics of sacredness.
Finally, I would like to complicate Whitehouse’s picture of where an
increase in technical understanding of social control might bring us. I
appreciate Whitehouse’s bold assertion of the possible good of this research, as
he presents a vision of the science of ritual leading to a better society. I feel
motivated by a similar vision. However, I personally proceed cautiously,
knowing that as I generate knowledge through public institutions, I relinquish
control over who has access to that power. While I think that the attempt to
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derive practical, applied understandings of the social function of rituals is
going to be challenging, the potential success of the endeavor gives me as much
pause as the potential failure. Whitehouse writes about the prevention of civil
war, but sometimes a civil war is initiated to overthrow a tyrant. Using an
understanding of the social function of ritual to disrupt group bonding in order
to prevent civil war resembles a picture of an oppressive government achieving
greater social control as much as it does one of a benevolent society inhibiting
dysfunctional fissioning. Something similar could be said for the use of group
bonding ritual by those in power to consolidate group commitment to an
oppressive, authoritarian state. Goebbels is certainly a clear self-aware
historical example of the latter. The Cointelpro program of the FBI in the
United States, used to disrupt civil rights, anti-war, and socialist groups, is an
example of the former. Where would civil rights be in the US, now, if the FBI
had applied more effective tools than they did for disrupting social
organizations like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Martin
Luther King Jr? We aspire to a kind of benign, collaborative social engineering
as we increase public knowledge of the social effects of ritual, but we should
understand that this knowledge will be applied by the different political actors,
potentially for cross purposes.
It is sometimes perhaps an academic fantasy that one’s social science
research will have some sort of potential application in the world, but to earn
our public paychecks, it behooves us to act as if it will. However, we have every
reason to suspect that any functionally useful knowledge we produce, should
we succeed in producing it, will be used asymmetrically by people in positions
of power to consolidate their power. We should not proceed blindly forward
guided by rosy fantasies of how benevolent governments will use power purely
for the public good. If we do have an intention of generating knowledge of
socio-political dynamics in order to facilitate the public good, we have to think
about how that understanding might be used by existing institutions and
specifically aim for the development of social techniques that are structurally
constrained from being utilized for oppressive purposes (Sharp, 2002). Some
of the organizing strategies of the Arab Spring may be a beginning, but
obviously as we look to Libya and the fallout into Mali, we aren’t there yet.
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Whitehouse convincingly argues for a distinction between two kinds of social
glue – identity fusion and social identification. In his earlier work he related
these to two memory systems, semantic and episodic (Whitehouse 2000).
Here I take a different tack by briefly reviewing two modes of social interaction
familiar to linguists and sociologists – the informal (or intimate) and the
formal — and considering how they may be major ingredients in the two kinds
of glue.
Two modes of interaction. Many languages distinguish between informal
and formal in their second person pronouns. In contrast to the basic,
unmarked, informal “you,” the formal “you” may treat the individual and his
social role as separate personalities, addressing the listener as a plurality — the
French polite vous (you plural) — or in the third person — the German Sie or
Italian lei (she). The informal/formal distinction may also show up as a
difference in address – “Lizzie” or “dude” versus “Miss Bennett,” “Your
Excellency,” “Your Holiness,” or “Professor.” The same distinction is evident in
different strategies for making polite requests. Positive politeness makes a
claim to intimacy (“Brother, can you spare a dime?”), negative politeness
shows deference (“Sir, might I trouble you …?”) (Brown and Levinson 1987,
Pinker 2007). The contrast also extends to clothing, comportment, and other
social interactions outside language, with the formal mode in each case being
more heavily scripted and allowing less room for improvisation.
Consider in more detail what intimacy involves. Intimacy among humans
presumably has some of the same neurohormonal bases as bonding in other
species. But there also seems to be a uniquely human cognitive side to intimate
I-thou interactions, involving the effort to establish shared intentions
(Tomasello et. al. 2005). This has been long studied in the field of linguistic
pragmatics (Pinker 2007). By way of illustration: suppose Fred and Wendy
Smith are a couple we know, and I tell you, “I saw Wendy kissing a man in the
park yesterday.” You are likely to infer that the man was not Fred. Why? I
could just as easily have said, “I saw Wendy kissing Fred in the park
yesterday.” Since I didn’t, presumably I meant to imply that the man wasn’t
Fred. This conclusion is not a logical deduction but a pragmatic inference,
where you infer meanings that I encourage you to infer. Pragmatic inference,
and shared intentions in general, depend on common knowledge (a term of art
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from game theory: not just what we both know, but what we both know we
both know). Our common knowledge in this case includes our particular
knowledge of Fred and Wendy, and our general knowledge of the maxim that a
cooperative speaker tries to supply as much relevant information as possible,
other things being equal. Similar reasoning leads you to conclude that when I
say something we know in common to be literally untrue (“What wonderful
weather for a picnic,” or “Death is the mother of beauty”) I am speaking
ironically or metaphorically.
Formal interactions may involve pragmatic inference as well, but they
involve more centrally another uniquely human specialization, that of treating
other people as occupants of social roles, apart from their personal qualities
(Bloch 2008). This dramaturgic faculty depends not so much on developing
shared intentions through one-off improvisation, as on following
conventionalized interactional scripts, including sheer rote, as in the army,
where “We salute the uniform, not the man.”
Two kinds of glue. I suggest that in rituals involving identity fusion and
social identification, the psychologies of informal and formal interactions,
respectively, are activated, although these psychologies are also active in many
non-ritual exchanges.
Consider identity fusion rituals. While most or (by definition?) all rituals
involve some degree of formalization, this class of ritual seem less concerned
with getting the ritual exactly right or exactly the same as last time, and more
concerned with changing participants for life – not just gluing them together,
but melting them down and reforging them. To some extent, identity fusion
rituals achieve this result through pain, ecstasy, and other high arousal states.
But there is also a cognitive side to these rituals, which (I suggest) comes from
their activating a process of pragmatic inference. As Whitehouse notes “a car
crash or even a traumatic experience on the battlefield [may] provoke a rather
limited array of reflections.” I suggest that identity fusion rituals are different
from crashes and war trauma because they are understood as symbolic acts
aimed at generating shared intentions. The intended meanings behind ritual
symbolism may be obscure, triggering a lasting open-ended process of
rumination. (“We have always fought wild pigs. But the initiator said that we
initiates are wild pigs who must be killed. He couldn’t have meant it literally,
so maybe he meant … or maybe …”) The episodic memory of shared extreme
experiences and the ongoing pondering of “What did he mean by that?” seem
to intensify social cohesion. While intense, intimate bonds develop without
rituals sometimes – between mother and child for example – with identity
fusion rituals they can extend further.
Social identity rituals, by contrast, involve more scripted behavior, and the
significance of this behavior is more likely to be spelled out, rather than left
open to pragmatic inference, as we would expect for formal social interactions.
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How does this contribute to understanding the social evolution of ritual? As
Whitehouse notes, although fusion is sometimes extended to very large
impersonal groups, the tendency is to shift to social identity rituals in the
doctrinal mode as societies grow more complex. Why is this? Why is the
routinization of charisma the rule in large-scale societies? The evidence from
linguistics and related areas suggests one possible partial answer: the formal
mode is employed not just in interactions with socially distant individuals
(where formality is expected on both sides), but in interactions with one’s
superiors (who are not obliged to be formal in return; they may answer your
vous with a tu.) It may be, then, that social identity rituals are more compatible
with the social stratification found in complex societies. By contrast, identity
fusion rituals make for more social solidarity, but they also threaten to melt
down hierarchies (Ehrenreich 2007). Attempts at extended fusion – as, for
example, in messianic and millenarian movements — are likely to be regarded
with suspicion by the powers that be, unless they are directed outward against
external enemies, or diverted into harmless channels, like Saturnalia or
Carnival.
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Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can
change the world; indeed, it’s the only thing that ever has.
—Margaret Mead
Harvey Whitehouse argues that we will be better able to resolve major
challenges of the 21st century—civil wars, collective action, poverty, and
environmental change—if we understand the “social glue” that binds people
together in common cause. In the past, research on this idea has been
dominated by social identity theory (SIT), in which individuals identify with
and favor ingroups. Whitehouse and colleagues suggest that SIT applies well
enough to large, anonymous groups, but fails to capture perhaps the most
powerful social glue of all: that which occurs in small groups undergoing
danger or hardship—a different phenomenon they call “identity fusion”. In
identity fusion, individuals and groups effectively melt into one entity,
permitting extraodinary levels of cooperation and altruism. SIT has been a
bedrock concept in social psychology for decades, and we welcome the
opportunity to rethink and bash the paradigm. We are fully onboard
Whitehouse’s boat, but want to paddle in a slightly different direction.
First, we think identity fusion highlights a major problem with SIT: how
membership in one group overlaps with memberships in other groups. Social
identity theory is problematic because it fails to predict how people will behave
when there are multiple overlapping groups, and identify fusion offers an
opportunity to sort out this deficiency. It offers predictions for when the glue
will be strongest, not least because fused identities trump social identities
when small groups share traumatic experiences.
Second, while identify fusion expands the SIT paradigm, we see fused
identity and social identity not as different types of social glue, but rather as
having different levels of stickiness. Individuals’ level of identification with
groups follows a continuum, from national identity that we have whether we
like it or not (some reject it), to teams of fire-fighters, say, whose group
integration is a matter of life or death. Social identity is usually just glue, and
sometimes fails to do anything. Identity fusion is superglue, and often has
amazing outcomes.
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When Does Glue Becomes Superglue?
We think the notion of a continuum of levels of stickiness can help to reconcile
Whitehouse’s argument that there are two types of glue, with the counterargument that there is only one glue, making identity fusion a version of social
identity (see Ingram and Prochownik’s commentary). We suggest that identity
fusion explains interpersonal relations according to context. In the absence of
groups, the notion of fused identity still seems to have a role as evinced by
Whitehouse’s example of “survivor bonds”. But in group contexts, while fused
identities may tend to occur in smaller groups, those individuals who make up
that group inevitably belong to some of the same wider ingroups. In this way,
fused identity seems located within social identity to an extent (which can
vary), and not necessarily an alternative. Of course, Swann and others argue
that identity fusion is empirically different from social identity, so there are
two things to explain. But this may be a failing of definitions of social identity
rather than of the concept itself (see also Ingram’s follow up comment).
But how might a fused identity arise from a social identity? Such a question
is key for those of us who are interested in explaining the process of
radicalisation, and hinges on the assumption that there are different levels of
‘groupness’. This problem is, we think, indicative of our own scholarly identity
confusion: not knowing whether and how to separate an individual-as-agroup-member from a range of possible groups (social identities) that seem
inextricably linked to one another, yet are also distinct in different
contexts. Where does a fused identity start and a social identity end?
A good example of this might be the army unit, the regiment, the service
(army vs. navy etc.), and the nation. The unit is fused having endured the
same costly rituals, training, and sharing the same type of traumatic
experiences of combat (Rielly, 2000). But this small group of individuals, so
tightly bonded, are also members of the wider armed forces, who are distinct
from the civilians they are fighting to protect within their nation, of which they
are also members. Whilst the unit itself is likely to be most tightly fused, the
fused group still has intimate ties with these larger, and more inclusive
ingroups. These ingroups are examples of social identities. Of course, the
argument may arise that they are members of “external identities” (one
category of identity fusion), but is there enough to differentiate between
external identity and social identity?

From Social to Fused Identity
The question then becomes, beyond a highly indoctrinated training
programme utilising rituals and shared experiences (such as military training),
or the direct experience of extreme hardship or danger, how do people form
fused identities within, or even against the grain of, social identities? Here we
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return to the process of social identity and suggest that individuals who
vicariously experience, say, injustice or prejudice on account of their group
membership (social identity) are likely to try and interpret these events
through the lens of that group membership (see Ginges and Atran 2011). So,
for example, I may not have been in Derry on bloody Sunday, but I was
personally traumatized by the killing of my Catholic brothers. Social identity
helps people understand this injustice according to their group membership—
thus the very interpretation of events are increasingly based on group
membership rather than individual experience (Tajfel and Turner, 1986;
Deschamps, 1982; Hewstone and Jaspars, 1982; Tajfel, 1979; Cairns, 1982;
Rabbie and Horwitz, 1982; Van Knippenberg, 1978).
It could well be this process of viewing the world through an ingroup lens
that enables, in fact, some degree of identity fusion with a set of likeminded
others, particularly in groups that may not have been particularly salient
before a particular nasty event (such as Bosnians before the Serbian
invasion). If so, identity fusion may begin to explain the notion of saliency of
social identity (i.e. how important to the self-concept the group membership
is) and interpersonal relationships within an ingroup that may lead to
fractions. This is important to understand involvement in extremist and
terrorist groups. Often terrorists are not directly affected by the events that
underlie their grievances, but they are sufficiently impacted by the suffering of
fellow ingroup members that they are prepared to die for the cause.

Self- versus Other-Centricities
Whitehouse differentiates the way in which social identity in individuals, and
fused identity in individuals, enable the perception of other members of the
ingroup. Social identity tends to lead to the deindividuation and
homogenisation of others within the ingroup as group members rather than as
individuals, whilst fused identities are porous, resulting in more vicariousness
of experiences of other (fused) group members who are nevertheless
recognised as unique individuals (Hornsey, 2008; Swann, et al., 2013). As
Whitehouse suggests, fused and social identities appear to serve different
functions. The process of identity fusion may enable a sort of other-concern,
which enhances feelings of empathy towards ingroup members (although to
what extent is not clear—i.e. to fused identity others or wider ingroup others?),
whilst social identification triggers self-concern, since the status of the group is
reflected in the individuals’ self concept (although see Brewer (1991) for an
alternative to self concept).
But in the absence of context (that is, different levels of groupness) it is
difficult to say whether this would change. For instance, a study by Hein et al.
(2010) showed that individuals in a group who experienced and then watched
316

Whitehouse: Social Evolution Forum. Cliodynamics 4.2 (2013)
others (ingroup and outgroup members) experience electric shocks had more
activation in the empathy areas of their brains (anterior insula and anterior
cingulate cortex) when watching ingroup rather than outgroup members
receiving the same shocks. Group membership was football team supporters
and subjects were tested in pairs. Would the shared suffering of group
membership and electric shocks lead to some type of fused identity? Or were
results simply based on group membership? We cannot be sure, but certainly
there is a link between the two since there was a difference in activation and
behavioural responses according to group membership. Interestingly,
empathy was also triggered, albeit on a lesser scale and much less frequently,
when outgroup members suffered too and this effect was mediated by positive
personal opinions of the outgroup individual. There may be hope for us as a
species yet.

Putting Social Glue to Use
In sum, identity fusion is a very welcome and much needed addition to social
identity theory that can shed light on some of the crucial, yet underdeveloped
concepts it is hinged on. We suggest that identity fusion operates within the
rubric of social identity—an extreme form of social identity—in which rather
than the group taking over the individual, the group becomes a vessel for the
individuals to be bonded together rather than bonded to the group. The glue is
not sticking them to a group concept, but to each other directly. This enables
us to see how an individual may go from self-centric yet group-oriented (via
social identity), to other-centric yet individual-centric (via identity
fusion). Finally, it highlights an important limitation of social identity theory
which is the inability to deal with multiple groups within groups and how those
different groups might be separated from one another. Identity fusion sticks
where mere social identity breaks.
If identity fusion is a superglue version of social identity, then what are the
implications for Whitehouse’s three wishes of resolving civil war, collective
action, poverty and environmental threats? On the one hand, it may bring
these wishes closer to the realms of possibility. If the vicarious exposure to
injustice and prejudice—to an ingroup as a whole—can achieve some degree of
identity fusion, then we may be able to make social glue stickier without
putting people through traumatic experiences themselves. Information,
presentation, and framing of good and bad events may be even more critical
than we thought. On the other hand, it suggests that we have an additional
obstacle, because in a globalizing world of broadening as well as narrowing
groups (federalism versus devolution, migration versus ghettoization, world
unions versus highly specific online groups), everyone is suffering from an
increasing confusion of identities—family, party, religion, state, nation, social
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network, west, east and so on. With so many strings of glue we may be pulled
in counter-productive and unpredictable directions. Finally, we should not
see social glue as a panacea. Roosevelt and Stalin got along well enough when
they had a common enemy in Hitler (and Japan). No glue was necessary for
remarkable levels of cooperation. But once Hitler was gone, the world was
divided for decades by the communist block and the free world. There may be
challenges of such gravitas that no glue is necessary to pull people together in
common cause, as well as divisions of such perceived importance that no glue
can bind them together.
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Harvey Whitehouse. More On Social Glue: A Response
to Commentaries
The discussions in this forum have raised some big issues, ranging from the
implications of two types of social glue for the evolution of groups (e.g.
Waring; Smith) to the practical and ethical challenges of seeking public policy
interventions based on our scientific theories and findings (e.g. Lanman;
Waring). I agree with most of the comments that have been posted and as
everybody points out we need more evidence before much more can be said.
But there are two issues I’d like to pick up. The first is a very basic question
about whether there really are two kinds of social glue (Kavanagh;
Buhrmester) or just one with varying degrees of ‘stickiness’ (Ingram and
Prochownik; Reeve and Johnson). The second is about whether social glue is
really the most important issue in addressing my three wishes for the world or
if other sources of altruistic behaviour should receive equal or greater priority
(e.g. Swann; Smith). Altruism has many sources but in my view social glue
plays an especially important role in solving collective actions problems that
carry high individual costs.

One or two kinds of social glue?
As an anthropologist who studies religion, I am always an outsider looking in –
albeit sympathetically. And that is often how I feel when trying to untangle the
intricacies of the social identity perspective on group psychology, which
appears (again, from the outside) to be forcibly reminiscent of a religious
organization. Although the social identity perspective has two branches –
Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) – all
followers subscribe to a mainstream orthodoxy with varying degrees of piety
and commitment. Core beliefs include that everything in group psychology,
including the phenomenon of identity fusion discussed in my target article,
falls within the ambit of the social identity perspective. As such, fusion appears
to be just one more sect under the infinitely extendable umbrella of the mother
church and her encompassing doctrines. Of course, outsider impressions can
319

Whitehouse: Social Evolution Forum. Cliodynamics 4.2 (2013)
be misleading and I cannot claim to have conducted long-term ethnographic
research among social identity theorists. So my comments on this topic will be
as tentative as they are curious and well intentioned – and no doubt shaped to
a degree by my having been trained to recognize the trappings of religious
fervour no matter how subtly it is expressed.
Field notebook in hand, I have spent the last few days tracking down
informants. Let’s begin by giving some space to their voices (it’s standard
practice in ethnographic research to disguise sources): “A while back,
advocates of SIT and SCT (self-categorization theory) realized that many of
their own workers didn’t believe in the main tenets of one or more cardinal
doctrines, e.g. functional antagonism (that activation of personal self reduces
salience of social self and vice-versa) and depersonalization (that groups
members are categorically interchangeable when the group is salient).”
Another informant described what happened next: “Instead of providing a
formal revision to the theory, some researchers simply endorsed arguments
that were in direct opposition to the original tenets. The result was that the
informally revised ‘theory’ now embraced both the original theoretical
ideas (e.g. functional antagonism and collective ties) and their opposites (e.g.
identity synergy and relational ties). The resulting ‘social identity perspective’
was immune to falsification.”
Unfalsifiable? This sounds like a set of beliefs that can’t be resolved on
empirical grounds. Like a religious system perhaps? Let’s explore this in more
detail…
According to Ingram and Prochownik identity fusion is probably just an
“extreme form of social identification.” Reeve and Johnson agreed with this
take on things, arguing that the notion of identity fusion merely “expands the
SIT paradigm.” But as Kavanagh and Buhrmester carefully argued in a series
of posts, the empirical evidence points to systematic differences between
fusion and identification. Kavanagh cited a body of empirical evidence showing
that existing measures of social identification simply cannot subsume identity
fusion. If, for example, personal and social identities are hydraulically related,
what is one to make of evidence that activating a personal identity enhances
the tendency for fused individuals to enact pro-group behaviour? Building on
this, Buhrmester pointed out that fusion theory focuses on the causal role of
relational ties to other group members as well as collective ties to the group
whereas the social identity perspective is only concerned with the latter. The
two kinds of social glue predict different psychological and behavioural
outcomes.
What motivates efforts to make identity fusion part of the social identity
perspective rather than, as the evidence suggests, an alternative theory of how
groups are glued together? The motivation doesn’t appear to stem from either
empirical or logical considerations but from a desire to maintain the
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sovereignty of a tradition. It is easy to underestimate the extent to which
academics (including good scientists) can form distinctive cultural traditions
that, just like any other traditions, can glue adherents to each other and to a set
of values and beliefs. And this makes the study of social glue all the more
complicated.
If we think of the social identity perspective as a kind of church it is a
relatively new one. There is of course a much bigger and older church, called
‘social science’. As Michael E. Smith reminded us, in an informative post
entitled somewhat indignantly “You Folks Should Pay Attention To Social
Science”, there is a grand tradition out there, one that has a more illustrious
history than the social identity perspective and a greater plethora of special
terms for things, ways of talking about them, and other special customs and
beliefs. When I started to read Smith’s commentary, I thought at first he was
going to say that we’d made a basic error that could have been avoided if only
we’d known about some previous research on the topic. But as I read on it
became clear that his main point was something quite different – that there is
another academic tradition over the hills that has lots of doctrines about social
glue, including what to call it and how to think about it.
To my mind, however, the most thought-provoking response of all, from a
big-picture perspective, was the one written by Lanman. He reminded us that
when we’re asking questions about human psychology we should ask about
both mechanism and function. To put this in the language of the evolutionary
sciences, we should address both proximate and ultimate causation. The social
identity perspective has taught us much of importance about the proximate
level but when we broaden the focus of groups research to consider issues of
ultimate causation we begin to understand social glue rather differently.
To appreciate why fusion and identification may be different it could help
to unpack their evolutionary histories. Lanman and I hypothesize that the
categorical ties studied by social identity theorists evolved to bind together
tribes and ethnic groups whereas identity fusion emerged to hold kin groups
together: two functions, two psychological mechanisms, and two kinds of
social glue. Kin psychology (on this view) regulates behavior among genetically
related individuals, facilitating exceptionally high levels of altruism towards
the group, rooted in the fusion of personal and social selves. Ethnic
psychology, by contrast, solves collective action problems using categorical ties
based on identification with groups. As Lanman succinctly put it:
“Whitehouse’s account of identity fusion as ‘psychological kinship’… which lies
at the heart of the imagistic mode of cohesion… utilizes the findings of both
evolutionary psychology and socio-cultural anthropology and can serve as a
reminder of the insights we can reach when we move past the more
exclusionist rhetoric sometimes used by scholars in these fields.”
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How important is social glue?
Several contributors to this discussion pointed out that a range of factors
contributes to altruistic behavior and that ‘social glue’ is only one of them. Bill
Swann, for example, mentioned shared interests, top down incentives and
deterrents, and ideologies that appeal to our capacities for empathy or right
and wrong. Arguably, however, social glue has a special role in motivating
altruism. You and I might share similar concerns about social problems,
discover common vested interests, and even agree on the best courses of
collective action, but I doubt whether any of this would motivate most of us to
make big sacrifices for the greater good.
Not everyone shares my hunch. Some prominent activists insist, for
example, that morality rather than social glue is the best way to address the
major collective action problems faced by our species. One of my three wishes
for the world was to eliminate extreme poverty. The moral philosopher Peter
Singer famously gives away a third of his income to the charity OXFAM and he
urges everyone else to do the same. I vividly remember a lecture given by
Singer in Oxford, at which he pointed out the wrongness of allowing extreme
poverty to persist in the world and the fact that we could eliminate the problem
overnight if we all set our minds to it.
But that’s the problem. We won’t all do it. And since we know that other
people won’t all do it, we typically decide not to do it ourselves. After the
lecture, I sat next to Singer at lunch and I put it to him that the moral
argument wasn’t going to change things. His response? It simply had to –
there was no other way. But as Swann points out there are indeed other ways.
Aside from moralizing we’ve seen many efforts to solve world problems
using a diversity of strategies. For example, over several decades concerted
effort has been made via high level international initiatives to redistribute
wealth from the world’s wealthiest countries to help the poorest and there has
long been broad agreement that 0.7% of GNP is a realistic target for provision
of aid. But apart from some outliers like Scandinavia, we have fallen woefully
short in achieving these kinds of targets. Swann mentions various mechanisms
of regulation in modern states that can be used to solve collective action
problems without relying directly on social glue – we can incentivize, legislate,
tax, subsidize, and do other things in a top-down fashion to tackle poverty. But
I would argue that none of these approaches works very well without the right
kinds and quantities of social glue.
Social glue plays a vital role in solving collective action problems in a
sustainable fashion. Without it, other mechanisms deteriorate and fail.
Examples are legion but to take just one from my own country: social glue was
essential to setting up the welfare state in the UK but it is now eroding because
of a culture of sponging and entitlement symptomatic of a progressive
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weakening of national cohesion. Whereas the social sciences have traditionally
provided quite sophisticated ways of understanding systems of regulation – in
economics, law, governance, politics, and so on – a more basic aspect of
coordination in society – social glue – has not been understood so well, and
figures less prominently in the thinking of policy makers and advisors. I think
it’s time to rectify the neglect.

Closing remarks
After much debate on points of detail, Gordon Ingram concluded an
informative thread in this debate by taking issue with my suggestion that
“when we fight back against injustice it’s because we believe that its victims
share our suffering. The victims are, in an important sense, one with us.”
Ingram retorted: “This, I think, is quite wrong: I predict that it is not necessary
to feel fused with someone in order to feel a duty of care towards them… it
comes down to the need for more empirical research: these are two testable
predictions and I hope that someone will test them soon. Until then, Harvey is
not really justified in making this sort of claim.” Ingram’s call for more data is
well taken. And I should have been careful to emphasize repeatedly that my
fusion-based explanation for altruism (including parochial altruism) is no
more than a working hypothesis rather than an established fact. But by the
same token Gordon is offering a counter-prediction rather than demonstrating
the wrongness of mine. Although we do need more evidence, the idea that
empathizing and moral reasoning are sufficient to motivate extreme sacrifice
for the group warrants skepticism. By contrast, there is already quite
compelling evidence that when compassion and morality are bolstered by a
visceral belief that the group is me, self-sacrificial commitment markedly
increases.
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